Problems with Abstract Observers and Advantages of a Model-Centric Paradigm

Abstract

Since 1974, when Heinz von Foerster made the distinction between “the cybernetics of observed systems” as first-order cybernetics (1oC) and “the cybernetics of observing systems” as second-order cybernetics (2oC), cybernetics has been dominated by this observer-centric paradigm. However, the abstract conceptualization of a pure-observer has no purpose except observing, which is like a person who is meditating so deeply with open unfocussed gazing eyes that they neither react to what they observe nor make memories of it. But when the observer has a specific purpose, “observer” ceases to be the best description of them. For example, if their purpose is to create a model of the system that is observed, then the best name for them is “modeler”, or if they are observing the system to ensure that it breaks no laws, then the names “auditor” or “conscience” are more accurate and useful descriptions than “observer”. And because there are an infinite number of possible reasons why an observer might observe a system, the term “observer” is completely ambiguous with respect to purpose, which renders it deficient in clarity and utility. So, when von Foerster introduced “the cybernetics of observing systems” it was vulnerable to many philosophical interpretations that are of no practical use. Consequentially, 1974 can be regarded as the year of the schism of cybernetics into two very different communities, which can be characterized (without observers) as “the cybernetics of regulated systems” and “the philosophy of cybernetics”. This schism has been as significant as the distinction between 1oC and 2oC. Just as the boundary of the system being considered can be decided arbitrarily as seems most useful, the distinction of whether the observed system contains an observer (2oC) or not (1oC) is quite arbitrary because there are many other equally valid criteria that can be used to slice the field of cybernetics into two parts. Yet when a cybernetician is deciding what the boundaries are of what she will consider to be the system being studied or its environment, she strives to maximize clarity and utility. However, this is not true of von Foerster’s observer-centric 1oC/2oC paradigm, and by his own account, it also limits cybernetics by excluding the possibility of the existence of a meaningful definition of third-order cybernetics. Fortunately, we can define a model-centric paradigm that has more utility to the practical application of cybernetics to real systems. In the model-centric paradigm, a first-order cybernetic regulator needs a model of the system that is being regulated (as required by the good regulator theorem), and because every model requires observations as inputs, the model not only brings into existence the need for an observer to exist, it also defines very precisely what information that observer must collect. A second-order cybernetic regulator maintains a second model, a model of itself, which is the only way it can achieve reflexivity. The second model requires self-observations, which requires a second observer that is well-defined by the needs and purpose of the second model. Now we are ready to imagine a type of regulator that requires a third model and a third observer: If the third model is a model of acceptable (ethical) behaviour, then a third observer is a necessary element of the system’s “conscience” that prevents or detects any violations of the model of ethical behaviour. In this paradigm, the cybernetics of systems that are designed to exhibit ethical behaviour can be characterized as third-order cybernetics (3oC). By being able to extend the paradigm to include ethical systems, the model-centric paradigm brings clarity and utility that is not possible using the philosopher-friendly observer-centric paradigm and its under-specified (abstract) observers.