Structural Coupling in Engagement Diplomacy: Case Study on South Korea’s Engagement Coalition for Buying Peace

Abstract

To solve contentious issues in international relations involves engagement and interaction with other partners rather than exclusion and containment. Engagement diplomacy needs a like-minded coalition between the state and the business sector in the domestic arena, a coalition that is apparently an essential aspect of structural coupling from the systems perspective. In the Cold War era, interstate security arrangements basically determined the economic relations among nations, whereas in times of globalization, business advances in both trade and investment frequently facilitate security cooperation. Centering on the theme of structural coupling, the paper examines the case of South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea after the launch of the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998. In particular, this paper responds to the three following questions: What are the criteria by which one can rigorously appraise the effects that the structural coupling of the economy and security has had on “buying peace” in the inter-Korean case? What factors made the respective preferences and interests of the state and the business sector in South Korea converge to lead (and sustain) a domestic coalition that has underpinned the engagement policy toward North Korea? What are the requisite factors for South Korea’s persistent engagement coalition for peace?