Un-safety: Systems Pathology of the Fukushima Nuclear Catastrophe

Shigeo Atsuji, Kazunori Ueda


The magnitude 9.0 earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan on March 11, 2011, were unavoidable natural disasters, but we consider the subsequent breakdown of the Fukushima nuclear power plants to be a catastrophe created not only by nuclear engineering systems but also by avoidable organizational errors – principally, neglect of nuclear safety issues without the necessary regulation both within the electric companies’ management and from the level of governmental policy making. The present paper reviews, firstly, a complete re-thinking of the non-rational locations of atomic power stations, secondly, an analysis of the irrational decision-making of safety management and nuclear policy, finally, a rational proposal concerning the fade-out of nuclear power throughout the world. These proposals are made with a view to obtain sustainable decision-making for the future, not simply in light of the supply and demand of electrical power, but also in consideration of environmental aspects including the social system and the ecosystem. This article is not criticism against the electric company and their government.


organizational disaster, limits of administration, sustainable decision-making

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